distinct neural systems. However, neither utility nor perceptual prediction can elude 116 uncertainty, a quantity whose minimization is posited to drive decision-making 117 (Friston et al., 2017; Schwartenbeck et al., 2015) . Thus percept variance is analogous 118 to the risk in predicting the utility of an investment (Markowitz, 1952) . Similarly, as 119 errors in predicting uncertainty arise in financial paradigms (Preuschoff et al., 2006; 120 through the consciousness barrier, as with bi-stable stimuli. This error in uncertainty 122 prediction can be dubbed surprise (Preuschoff 2006; Schwartenbeck et al., 2015; 123 Faraji et al., 2018) . 124
125
In previous work, we studied objective, expected uncertainty (risk) and its error 126 (surprise) in value-based decision-making with a gambling task, finding a role for the 127 insula in response to both (Preuschoff et al., 2008a) . To determine if the same 128 computational account and neural mechanism capture perceptual uncertainty and 129 surprise, we sought a task that mimics the probabilistic nature of a gamble, but 130 provokes internally generated perceptual errors. To meet this last criterion, we elicited 131 uncertainty with a multi-stable stimulus, the Necker Cube (Necker, 1832) , which 132 prompts spontaneous perceptual switches without a corresponding change in stimulus. 133
134
The insula is a bilateral, cortical region that is generally involved in interoception, 135
where bodily signals are integrated into feeling states (Craig & Craig, 2009 ). The 136 region is implicated in several functions (Uddin et al, 2017) but is commonly found in 137 studies that include error detection (Klein et al., 2013) or a deviant stimulus (Menon 138 & Uddin, 2010) . This hypothesized function of the anterior insula highlights its 139 eligibility as a candidate region for generalized uncertainty processing, as uncertainty 140 presents both a mathematical error and a feeling state. Given the anterior insula's 141 emergence in perceptual difficulty (Binder et al., 2004; Thielscher & Pessoa, 2007) 142 and in economic uncertainty (Platt & Huettel, 2008; Grinband et al., 2006; Brevers et 143 al, 2015; Preuschoff et al., 2008a; Mohr et al., 2010; Rutledge et al., 2010) , we 144 hypothesized this region's responses correlate with domain-independent uncertainty 145 (Preuschoff et al., 2008b) . 146 147 Does uncertainty call on a dedicated neural system, irrespective of functional 148 domain? We examine this question with a common computational account of 149 uncertainty in both perceptual and financial tasks, administered to the same 150 participants during functional magnetic resonance (fMRI) acquisition. We 151 hypothesized that 1) first order perceptual and reward prediction errors prompt 152 distinct, task-specific BOLD responses in visual and striatal areas, respectively; 2) 153 6 endogenous (perceptual) and exogenous (economic) uncertainty, will correlate with 154 an insular response. 155 156
Materials and Methods 157
Recruitment 158
The study was performed across two sessions scheduled within one week of each 159 other. Sessions were separated due to the considerable length of time spent in the 160 scanner for each (~45 minutes). The first session comprised the financial uncertainty 161 task (the Card Game, Figure 1a ) and the second the perceptual uncertainty task (the 162 Necker Cube Onset task and the Necker Cube Continuous Task) ( Figure 1c and 163 Figure 1d ). A total of 29 participants were recruited in the Card Game (13 female, 16 164 male) with a mean age of 25.13 years, of which 4 participants' datasets were excluded 165 for the following reasons; behavioral datasets from the three first participants were 166 not recorded due to technical reasons, while the 4 th showed an error rate (combination 167 of missed bets and incorrect trial outcomes) greater than 30% across the three 168 sessions. Twenty-two of the initial pool of 29 participants went on to perform the 169 Necker Cube task; the other 7 were lost to attrition. Of these, 19 had also completed 170 the Card Game. In the Necker Cube onset task, 22 subjects were included for analysis 171 (one being excluded for poor behavioral responses to stimulus classifications) and in 172 the Necker Cube continuous task, one additional subject was excluded for 173 inconsistent behavioral data (too few perceptual switches across the experiment). In 174 total, 18 same participants (8 female, 10 male) completed both sessions to yield 175 usable neuroimaging and behavioral data. The study was approved by the local ethics 176 committee and conformed to the declaration of Helsinki. Participants were recruited 177 through online and paper advertisements broadcast on the Ecole Polytechnique 178
Fédérale de Lausanne and Université de Lausanne campuses. The following inclusion 179 criteria were applied: English speaking; over the age of 18; healthy; normal vision. 180
Exclusion criteria from participation included: history of psychiatric or neurological 181 illness; previous or current psychotropic drug use; metal implants; pregnancy; 182 sensitivity to noise or closed spaces. 183 7 Procedure 184
For each of the two sessions, participants were sent digital versions of the study's 185 information and consent forms on the eve of their study sessions for review. Upon 186 arrival to the study room, participants were queried regarding their understanding of 187 the information before providing their signed consent. Participants were then subject 188 to additional MR safety screening prior to entering the scanning room. 189
Tasks 190

Financial Uncertainty Task 191
We employed a gambling task performed during functional magnetic resonance 192 imaging (fMRI) acquisition. We used an auditory version of a card game (Preuschoff 193 et al., 2006) , which has yielded reliable results when modeled by our chosen 194 computational framework. In the task, participants had an equal probability of 195 winning or losing 1 CHF (~1 USD) at each trial, starting with an initial endowment of 196 25 CHF. At each round, participants were instructed to place a bet via manual button 197 press on whether a second card drawn from a deck of ten cards would be higher or 198 lower than a first card drawn from the same deck. The bet was made prior to any card 199 being drawn, at which point outcome probability is at 0.5, and the expected value of 200 reward is 0. Following the bet, participants heard the value of the first card. After a 201 5.5 second interval, participants heard the value of the second card. After another 5.5 202 s interval, participants were instructed to report whether they had won or lost the 203
round. An incorrect response incurred a penalty of 25 ¢ off a round's total payoff. 204
Each trial lasted approximately 25 s (Figure 1a ). Inter-trial interval durations were 205 randomly jittered (2-5s). All possible card pairs, excluding pairs of identically valued 206 cards, were presented to each participant in a random order, totaling 90 trials per 207 experiment. No two participants played the same sequence of gambles. These 90 trials 208 were divided into three blocks of 30 trials each, to give participants the opportunity to 209 rest between blocks. Each block began with a new 25 CHF endowment. As the task 210 was auditory in nature, once the functional sequence was launched, participants were 211 presented with a black fixation-cross centered on a gray-scale screen throughout the 212 experiment. The task was sounded with the use of Mac OSX text-to-speech function, 213 with the voice of 'Alex'. Instructions and stimuli were pre-recorded into wav files and 214 To manipulate perceptual uncertainty, we used different versions of a "Necker Cube" 221 stimulus (figure 1b). Most individuals perceive this wireframe representation of a 222 cube as either a cube seen from-above or from-below, with alternations between the 223 two interpretations. We warped the angles of the cube to bias perceptual 224 interpretations towards one or the other direction. 225
Necker Cube, onset task 226
We presented observers with the 21 versions of the cube depicted in figure 1b. Each 227 version was presented a total of 10 times, in random order (figure 1c). Each 228 presentation lasted 3s, followed by a 2-s blank. Observers were asked to report their 229 percept ("from-above", "from-below", as instructed with pictures of extreme versions 230 prior to the experiment) by using two buttons of an MR-compatible response box. To 231 avoid lateralization effects, the assignment of buttons to percepts was counterbalanced 232 across participants. If participants failed to respond within the 2s blank period, the 233 trial was treated as missing data. 234 Necker Cube, continuous task 235 For this task, 5 different versions of the Necker cube were used. These were selected 236 for each individual based on onset-task results. To this end, we fitted a cumulative 237
Gaussian to the dependence of the fraction of "seen from-above" reports on the 238 physical distortion level (cf. figure 2a ). Based on this fit, we determined the points at 239 which 20%, 35%, 50%, 65% and 80% views from-above would be reported. (Note 240 that in a few cases, this implied extrapolation to more extreme warpings). Although it 241 cannot be expected that the predominance of the "from-above" view during prolonged 242 viewing (i.e., the percentage of time the "from-above" view is reported dominant) 243 provides a 1-to-1 match to numbers that are based on short presentations, they 244 nonetheless provide a good range in which the respective individual should show 245 variations in pre-dominance around an equi-dominance for both interpretations. For 246 the continuous task, we therefore presented those 5 stimulus versions to participants 247 that corresponded to their individual 20%, 35%, 50%, 65% and 80% fits from the 248 onset task. These stimuli were presented in 11 trials, for 80 seconds at a time (figure 249 1d). The 50% stimulus was shown in the first, the sixth and the eleventh trial, the 250 order of the other stimuli was random (one presentation each in trials 2 through 5, one 251 in trials 7 through 10). Participants were asked to report switches of their perception 252 by a button press, one button for switches towards the "from-below", another for 253 switches towards the "from-above" state. Crucially, participants were asked to report 254 on perceptual switches only if they arose, to encourage a passive viewing and 255 experience of perceptual switches. Button assignment in each individual was 256 consistent with the onset task. Four of the 11 trials (one per cube version, randomly 257 picked), were followed by a replay phase, in which strongly disambiguated Necker 258
Cube versions were presented to induce perceptual changes exogenously at the same 259 time-points as reports in the previous experimental phase. Replay phases were 260 excluded from the analysis of behavioral data, as were rare occasions of reported 261 switches that were followed by a "switch" to the same state (i.e., the same button was 262 pressed twice in succession). The latter were also removed from imaging analysis (see 263 below). 264
265
All tasks were coded in Matlab (Matlab and Statistics Toolbox Release 2013a, 266
TheMathWorks, Inc., Natick, Massachusetts, United States) and the Psychophysics 267
Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997; Kleiner et al, 2007) . 268 269
Image acquisition 270
Scans were acquired on a Siemens 3T Prisma at the Centre Hospitalier Universitaire 271
Vaudois. Once settled in the bore, we acquired first a localizer scan, followed by a 272 gre-field mapping scan to generate voxel displacement maps (64 slices; 3 x 3 x 2.5 273 Base resolution 64 mm). We then alerted participants to the beginning of the task and 277 functional acquisition. Parameters for our EPI sequence were as follows: 2D EPI, 278
Multi-Echo sequence (3 echo times), 3 x 3 x 2.5 mm resolution, FOV = 192 mm; FA 279 = 90 degrees, slice TR = 80 ms; TE = (17.4; 35.2; 53 ms); base resolution 64 mm; 34 280 slices; volume TR = 2.72 s; parallel acceleration mode = GRAPPA, with an 281 acceleration factor = 2. At the end of the experimental session, anatomical T1-282 weighted images were acquired with the following sequence parameters: MPRAGE, 283 1x1x1 mm resolution; FOV = 256 mm; slice TR/TE = 2 ms/2.39 ms; FA = 9 degrees; 284 base resolution = 256 mm). 285 286
Image preprocessing 287
Functional scans were preprocessed and analyzed using SPM 12. As we employed a 288 multi-echo EPI sequence with 3 echo times, we first summed the three volumes to 289 obtain one scan per TR (Kettinger et al., 2016; Poser & Norris, 2009 ). We applied 290 slice-timing correction to the volumes, as they were acquired with a comparatively 291 long effective TR (2.72 s) (Sladky et al., 2011) . We then generated voxel 292 displacement maps (VDM) and applied these to functional volumes. Volumes were 293
warped and realigned to the mean functional image using least squares and a 6 294 parameter (translations and rotations in space), rigid-body transformation to correct 295 for intra-session motion artifacts, before applying a bias-field correction. Then 296 individual T1-weighted volumes were co-registered to the mean functional image 297 using a rigid body model, estimated with mutual information. The T1 image was then 298 segmented (6 class tissue probability maps) and normalized to MNI space using 299 unified segmentation (Ashburner & Friston, 2005) . These normalization parameters 300 were then applied to functional volumes. Volumes were then smoothed with a 301
Gaussian kernel of 8 mm FWHM (Friston et al., 1995) . The resulting images were 302 used for analysis. 303 304
Mathematical Models of Uncertainty 305
We modeled first-and second-order uncertainty in the predictive (indexed by 306 expected outcomes, and their variance) and in the outcome phase of a decision 307 (formalized by errors in expected outcomes and errors in their expected variance). 308
Variance has interchangeably been called risk in economic circles (Markowitz, 1952) 309 and expected uncertainty in neuroeconomics studies (Payzan-Le Nestour et al., 2013) . 310
Errors arising from predicted uncertainty have been dubbed surprise (Preuschoff et 311 al., 2006; Faraji et al., 2018) . In our tasks, we employ mathematical models of 312 uncertainty and surprise that have previously been used for the financial uncertainty 313 task (Preuschoff et al., 2006; Preuschoff et al., 2008a; Preuschoff et al., 2011). 314 Risk is analogous to mathematical models of entropy (Quartz, 2009; Faraji et al., 315 2018) . We use risk prediction error as a measure of surprise, which yields values that 316 are highly correlated with alternative models of surprise, notably absolute prediction 317 error (Preuschoff, et al., 2011) and Shannon information (Strange et al., 2005 ) (see 318
Appendix 3). Therefore we do not consider alternative accounts of predicted 319 uncertainty or surprise as competing models to our study. We borrow the same 320 accounts used in our previous studies and adapt them to our perceptual uncertainty 321 task in order to build on previous results relating to economic decision-making 322 ( Figure 1e ). 323
Our measures of perceptual uncertainty are based on the variance of the probability 324 distribution associated with viewing the cube from-above. Each Necker Cube 325 stimulus is endowed with an expected value, the average of the probability of viewing 326 a cube from-above and the probability of viewing the cube from-below. We derive 2 327 measures of perceptual uncertainty associated with a Necker Cube stimulus, one 328 objective and one subjective. For subjective uncertainty, we compute the squared 329 difference of a probability associated with viewing a given stimulus from-above from 330 the expected value of that same stimulus squared, based on individual responses in the 331 Necker Cube -onset task. Objective uncertainty is derived by computing the same 332 formula, but with assumed probabilities of viewing the cube from above based on the 333 cube's warp bias. These measures mirror risk accounts used in economic contexts but 334 for one difference; expected values in the latter are associated with a monetary gain, 335 or reward. Here, we substitute a monetary gain value of +1 with a from-above 336 perceptual outcome of +1; similarly, we substitute a monetary loss value of -1 with a 337 from-below perceptual outcome of -1. Finally, we derive a prediction error related to 338 the switch by subtracting the stimulus' expected value from the perceptual state 339 following the perceptual switch; and a risk prediction error captured by the difference 340 between the squared prediction error and the stimulus-associated risk value. The expected values of a percept, respectively, reward, are distinct from expected 361 uncertainty, as the first represents a linear function while the second is quadratic. The 362 same relationship can be applied to first and second order prediction errors. Below, 363
we pooled all emergent decision variables across trials in all sessions and participants 364 in the Financial Uncertainty task: 365 366 We performed a model-based fMRI analysis on all 3 experimental tasks (Card game, 374
Necker onset, Necker continuous) using a summary statistic approach (Worsley et al., 375 2002) . To address our research question, we first analyzed individual subject EPI 376 time-series using a fixed-effects general linear model (GLM) before pooling subject-377 level contrast images in a random effects analysis, where contrasts of interest were 378 examined with one-sample t-tests to obtain an average response. Regressors in the 379 respective GLMs were convolved with the hemodynamic response function (Glover, 380 1999) ; an AR(1) model was employed to address autocorrelation in the timeseries. 381
Regressors for specific onsets were parametrically modulated by decision variables 382 (see Figure 2 ). We applied the same computational models to both the financial and 383 perceptual uncertainty paradigms via parametric modulation. Each parametric 384 modulator was serially orthogonalized with respect to the event onset and sequentially 385 to prior parametric modulators. While our main research question rests on a strong a 386 priori hypothesis concerning a target brain region (anterior insula) (Platt & Huettel, 387 2008; Grinband et al., 2006; Brevers et al, 2015; Preuschoff et al., 2008a; Mohr et al., 388 2010; Rutledge et al., 2010) , and we also do not expect dramatic signal changes, we 389 nonetheless opted to conduct whole-brain analyses for all univariate models below, 390 with the aim of 1) highlighting the specificity of the anterior insula with respect to 391 uncertainty; 2) conforming to best practices relating to fMRI analyses (Eklund et al., 392 2016) . Below, we describe GLMs applied to each task in greater detail. 393 394
Financial Uncertainty 395
In the card game, we modeled the 5.5 s period after the participant hears the value of 396 card 1 as a boxcar function and further parametrically modulated these events with 397 expected reward followed by a risk value; and we further modeled the 5.5 s period 398 after the participants hears the value of card 2 with a boxcar function and 399 parametrically modulated these epochs with a reward prediction error followed by a 400 risk prediction error. The model also included two nuisance regressors including 401 events modeled as delta functions, including one for button press events (0s duration), 402 to report the bet and the trial outcome, and one for sound, upon hearing instructions 403 for the bet placement and the trial report (0s) duration ( Figure 2c ). Expected reward 404 and risk, as well as reward prediction error and risk prediction error are not expected 405 to correlate ( Figure 1e ) and show little evidence of multicollinearity in subject-level 406 design matrices. These quantities are further subject to serial orthogonalization in the 407 SPM software. Also included in the GLM were 6 movement related regressors of no 408 14 interest. 409 410 Necker Cube -onset task 411
We constructed 2 general linear models containing 2 experimental regressors as well 412 as 6 movement-related regressors of no interest. The GLMs differed along one 413 dimension; specifically, in one GLM, perceptual risk was computed based on 414 objective probabilities of viewing a trial-related stimulus from-above, or probabilities 415 related to the degree of experimentally manipulated cube bias towards one percept or 416 another; while in the other, perceptual risk values were derived from subjective 417 probabilities of perceiving one cube representation or another, computed at the end of 418 the task from individual participants' reports. The first regressor in both GLMs 419 contained onsets for stimulus presentation, modeled as boxcar functions of 3 seconds 420 (the viewing period), parametrically modulated by risk values. The second regressor 421 in the GLM contained onsets for button presses during the response window modeled 422 as delta functions (Figure 2a ). 423 424 Perceptual Surprise, Necker Cube continuous task 425
In the continuous task of the perceptual uncertainty experiment, we constructed a 426 GLM with the following regressors. Our primary regressor of interest was composed 427 of perceptual switches modeled as delta functions, parametrically modulated by the 428 perceptual prediction error, followed by the risk prediction error, or surprise, and 429 finally by the amount of time spent in the previous perceptual state, to control for 430 potential time-related effects. We eschewed the analysis of risk prediction in this task 431 because such an analysis presents 2 problems: the onset of the dominance times are 432 the same as the those of the switches, introducing a problem of multi-collinearity; 433 second, dominance times vary widely within and across individuals. Investigating 434 onsets with variable durations parametrically modulated by risk suggests that the trial-435 by-trial risk variability may also be modulated in strength by time alone, which may 436 confound probing of perceptual risk. For these reasons, we confined the study of 437 perceptual risk to the onset task. 438
The risk prediction error was computed based on the participant's individual 439 probability of seeing a stimulus from-above or from-below and modeled each switch 440 by this value given both the stimulus and the perceptual state into which the 441 participants switched to. The 5 different levels of cube warping towards a from-above 442 state (20%, 35%, 50%, 65% and 80%) yielded 5 values of surprise, with maximal 443 surprise emerging for least likely perceptual states in most disambiguated stimuli 444 (e.g., switching into a "from-below" perceptual state for a cube biased at 80%). We 445 further included replay condition presses as a regressor in the model to account for 446 BOLD responses to exogenous stimulus switches. These regressors were convolved 447 with the canonical HRF. We also included 6 motion-related regressors of no interest 448 in the GLM (Figure 2b) . Of 29 participants, four were excluded for technical reasons. Twenty-five remaining 455 participants were included in the analysis of the financial uncertainty task. 456
Participants were paid for one out of the three blocks performed. Average task-related 457 payout per participant was 29.57 CHF; across all blocks and participants, payoffs 458 were in the range of 13-39 CHF. Trials where participants either missed a bet 459 placement or provided an incorrect response to the trial's outcome were excluded 460 from analysis. Participants who showed an overall error rate of >30% were excluded 461 from analysis (1 participant). Error rates ranged from 0 to 26.67%, with the majority 462 of participants (15) showing error rates of 1.11%. 463
We tested for mean differences between higher and lower bets across sessions and 464 found no significant difference (F = .19, p =.8324, df =2). There was a significant 465 difference in bet choice in all tasks however, with participants choosing a higher over 466 a lower bet in all sessions (F = 34.69, p <0.001, df =1). We cannot conclude that there 467 is a bias towards selecting higher bets in spite of this result, because buttons 468 indicating a higher bet were consistently on the right side for all subjects. Significant 469 results may reflect handedness rather than bet preference. We further examined 470 "strategic" bets within sessions, by tallying bet switches following a loss with bet 471 maintenance following a win, as a measure of previous-bet influence, compared to 472 non-strategic counterparts. We find a significant preference (t = -3.01, p = 0.0035, df 473 = 74) for non-strategic bet placement, suggesting participants understood the random 474 nature of the task and did not deploy a strategy. However, we also performed 475 binomial tests on the proportion of strategic to non-strategic bets for each session, 476 tested against the null (50%) and found 14 sessions to show a significant preference 477 for "strategic" betting. 478
Perceptual Uncertainty Tasks -Behavioral Results 479
In the onset task, participants were briefly presented 21 different versions of the 480 Necker Cube and the percentage of "view from-above" was determined across 10 481 presentations of each. One participant, who classified all versions of the Necker as 482 seen from-above, was excluded from further analysis. As intended, "from-above" 483 percepts increased with warping level and were well fitted by a cumulative Gaussian 484 function (Figure 3a, gray) . The "point of subjective equality" -i.e., the warping at 485 which 50% "from-above" was perceived -was slightly shifted towards warpings 486 indicating "from-below" (Figure 3a ). This is consistent with a "from-above" bias for 487 the symmetric configuration. The fitting of the Necker Cube onset responses yielded 488 an average R 2 = 0.80; and k= 4.07 across 22 subjects. 489
From the individual fits, we determined the cube versions at which the individual had 490 20%, 35%, 50%, 65% and 80% dominance for the "view from-above" at onset. The 491 corresponding cubes were used for the continuous task in the respective individual. 492
From the analysis of this task, one additional participant who on average reported less 493 than 1 perceptual transition per condition, was excluded. Since the task differed 494 between the onset task (respond to a cube onset) and the continuous task (report 495 switches during continuous viewing) it could not be expected that predominance of 496 the from-above percept (i.e., the percentage of time the from-above percept is seen as 497 dominant) would match 1-to-1 to the nominal values of 20%...80%. Nonetheless, we 498 found that the manipulation was successful: in the rivalry conditions of the continuous 499 task, there was a significant main effect of manipulation on predominance 500 (F(4,80)=22.8, p<.001; repeated-measures ANOVA) and the increase with the 501 manipulation level was monotonic and as intended (Figure 3b ). Importantly, there was 502 also a significant main effect of the cube manipulation on dominance durations 503 (F(4,80)=3.53, p=.01) with a minimum at the intermediate manipulation ("50%") and 504 increasing values towards the more extreme cubes (Figure 3c ). This is consistent with 505 the intended experimental manipulation: high levels of uncertainty at the "50%" level, 506 medium levels of uncertainty at the "35%" and "65%" level and low levels of 507 uncertainty at the "20%" and "80%" level. We fit dominance times from all 508 individuals to a gamma distribution to determine the temporal characteristics of 509 perceptual switches (Zhou et al., 2004) Functional data analysis was implemented in SPM12b (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) at 519 the single subject level, and the SnPM toolbox (http://warwick.ac.uk/snpm) for group 520 level analyses. Our second level analysis comprised whole-brain permutation tests (10 521 000 permutations), with a variance smoothing of 8 mm. We applied a false discovery 522 rate (FDR; Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995) threshold of 0.05 at the voxel-level to 523 control for false discovery rates (Hahn & Glenn, 2018) . For completeness, we also 524 report results using a whole-brain family-wise error corrected threshold of p = 0.05 at 525 the voxel level, to control for Type 1 errors (Eklund et al., 2016) . Cluster sizes below 526 are reported in voxels; left and right designate neurological orientation. 527 528
Financial Uncertainty 529
Contrast Reward Prediction Error (RPE) 530
We performed a one-sample t-test on the parametrically modulated outcome of each 531 trial by its corresponding RPE value. A positive signed t-test on this regressor using 532 FDR correction yields significant clusters in expected areas, notably bilaterally in the 533 caudate (right and left, p = 0.009 and 0.015, t =4.26 and 3.95, k = 250 and 361) and 534 the cingulate cortex (left middle and right posterior, p =0.017 and 0.022, t =3.93 and 535 3.87, k = 74 and 67). We further find significant clusters bilaterally in the inferior 536 frontal gyrus (p =0.009 and 0.009, t =6.94 and 4.86, k = 7910 and 1012), left 537 hippocampus (p = 0.009, k = 75, t =3.72); and right middle temporal gyrus (p = 0.011, 538 t =4.21 and k = 114) ( Figure 4a ). When controlling for FWE, we find significant 539 peaks in right inferior frontal gyrus (p = 0.001; t = 6.94; k = 150); left medial frontal 540 cortex (p =0.004; t = 5.57; k = 202); left superior frontal gyrus (p = 0.022; t = 4.92; k 541 = 10); left middle temporal gyrus (p = 0.036; t = 4.74; k = 5). 542 543
Contrast Risk Prediction Error (RiPE) 544
Trial outcomes at Card 2 were further modulated by their risk prediction errors 545 (surprise) in addition to their reward prediction errors. We replicate previously 546 reported results for surprise at Card 2, where we find significant clusters in the left 547 and right insulae (p =0.031 and 0.031, t =4.70 and 4.56, k = 870 and 1597) and the 548 right caudate (p =0.029, t =4.96, k = 293), as well as left and right medial temporal 549 gyri (p =0.029 and 0.029, t =6.11 and 5.33, k = 1237 and 694) (Figure 4d ). While 550 memory regions are not of direct interest to our research question, significant clusters 551 in the medial temporal gyri support the notion that surprise is predicated on 552 comparing current evidence against past predictions. Controlling the FWE rate, we 553 find significant responses in left and right middle temporal gyrus (p < 0.001 and p = 554 0.006; t = 6.11 and t = 5.33; k = 118 and k = 32); right caudate (p = 0.019; t = 4.96; k 555 = 6); and left anterior insula (p = 0.0429; t = 4.7; k = 4) 556 557 Perceptual Uncertainty 558
Onset task -contrast risk 559
We performed a t-test on the viewing period of the cube (3s) prior to the participant's 560 percept selection, modulated by the stimulus risk to probe perceptual risk activation. 561
Perceptual risk was defined as the variance related to the average perceptual value of 562 a stimulus, based on the probabilities of its being viewed from-above or from-below. 563
Using experimentally derived subjective risk values, whole brain analysis reveals 564 responses in the left and right anterior insula (p =0.009, t =4.10, k = 74; p= 0.014, t 565 =3.95, k =44) (Figure 4c ). Objective risk values yielded no significant voxels, 566 underlining the importance of accounting for individual differences in perception. 567
Using a FWE error rate on the same data, we find the same significant clusters in left 568 and right insula (p = 0.009 and p =0.014; t = 4.10 and t = 3.95; k = 74 and k = 44). 569 570
Continuous task -Contrast Perceptual Prediction error 571
In the Necker Cube Continuous task, we modulated the manual response to a 572 perceptual switch with 3 values: the first-order perceptual prediction error; the time 573 spent in the previous perceptual state, to account for BOLD responses related to 574 dominance times; and a perceptual risk prediction error. We first performed a contrast 575 on the perceptual prediction error, to account for a first-order error as we do in the 576 Card Game for reward prediction error. Results show significant clusters in the 577 precuneus (p = 0.035, t =5.20, k = 2231), left and right angular gyri (p = 0.035 and 0. 578 046, t =4.75 and 4.34, k = 882 and 19), left and right occipital poles (p = 0.040 and 579 0.035, t =4.24 and 4.41, k =32 and 68), left and right hippocampi (p = 0.035 and 580 0.035 , t =4.34 and 4.56, k = 232 and 122), and right middle temporal gyri (p = 0.035, 581 t =4.75, k =392) for this contrast (Figure 4b) . Thus the pattern here shows a response 582 in memory regions (hippocampus and middle temporal gyrus) in addition to the visual 583 system, suggesting the error calls on higher-level functions such as memory, to 584 compare previously held expectations to the current evidence, in addition to 585 perceptual processes. Applying a FWE correction yields significant results in the left 586 precuneus (p = 0.024; t = 5.20; k = 31). 587 588
Continuous task -Contrast Perceptual Risk Prediction error (Surprise) 589
A positive contrast for the perceptual risk prediction error yielded significant clusters 590 in several regions of the visual system, including bilateral mid, inferior and fusiform 591 occipital gyri and left calcarine cortex. In addition however, significant BOLD 592 responses were found bilaterally in the anterior insulae (p = 0.035 and 0.040, t =4.34 593 and 3.85, k = 172 and 56) ( Figure 4e ). Using FWE, we find significant responses in 594 the left middle occipital gyrus (p = 0.014; t = 5.34; k = 38); right precentral gyrus (p = 595 0.025; t = 5.07; k = 8); right occipital fusiform gyrus (p = 0.029; t = 5.01; k = 12); and 596 left inferior occipital gyrus (p = 0.030; t = 4.99; k = 8). 597
We further examined whether surprise values associated with exogenous switches in 598 the replay condition contributed to anterior insular response. We designed a GLM 599 including a regressor for both report and replay onsets, parametrically modulated by 600 their first and second order prediction errors. Stimulus switch in the replay condition 601 is expected and therefore should not incur surprise, however there is a possibility that 602 a stimulus change, be it exogenous or endogenous, drives anterior insular response. 603
Average coefficient values across participants in the anterior insula for both report 604 and replay surprise are decreased relative to report only, although not significantly so 605 (t = 1.33, p = 0.2, df =20) (Appendix 1). 606 607
Financial and Perceptual Risk Prediction Error (Surprise) -Conjunction Analysis 608
To test for a common BOLD response to surprise across the two tasks, we performed 609 a conjunction analysis of the surprise contrasts in the financial and perceptual 610 paradigms (N = 25 and N = 21, respectively). We performed this analysis in SPM by 611 selecting a two-sample t-test design for non-independent samples of unequal variance. 612
We performed this test at the whole brain, peak level using a FWE error corrected 613 threshold. We tested against the conjunction null (logical AND), to determine which 614 voxels were found significant in both tasks (Friston et al., 2005) and found a 615 significant cluster in the left anterior insula (p = 0.042, FWE corrected; k = 33; peak 616 voxel coordinates -36, 16, -4) as well as a non-significant cluster in the right anterior 617 insula (p = 0.078, FWE corrected; k = 8; peak voxel coordinates (34, 24, -4) ( Figure  618 4f). FDR correction could not be used in this instance, because all significant voxels 619 were clustered in the anterior insula exclusively; this imposes the false discovery rate 620 on said clusters, yielding an infinite T threshold of significance 621 622
Axiomatic Model Testing of the Risk Prediction Error in the Anterior Insula 623
Reward prediction errors in the striatum have been shown to act as true prediction 624 errors (Rutledge et al., 2010), meaning regional striatal responses track with 625 increasing RPE. Although a corollary linear relationship of risk prediction error with 626 the anterior insula is implied in the model-based analysis above, it could be driven by 627 one particular high level of surprise included in the task design. To determine if the 628 anterior insula tracks increasing levels of surprise, we designed a general linear model 629
where card game outcome and perceptual switch onsets were categorized into three 630 levels of respective first order prediction error. We extracted individual mean anterior 631 insula values for each of these first-level contrasts and averaged these for each level 632 of surprise, for each task. A true risk prediction error encoded in the anterior insula 633 should yield a v-shaped curve for each task, with lowest and highest first order PE 634 both yielding high surprise. We find this pattern for both tasks, highlighting that the 635 anterior insula encodes surprise across both task domains ( Figure 5 ), although the two 636 curves neither overlap perfectly nor are they symmetrical. We performed an ANOVA 637 with surprise level and task as factors. We find a significant effect of surprise levels 638 on anterior insula mean coefficient values (F = 6.63, p = 0.018, df = 2) but no effect 639 of task (F = 0.22, p = 0.6403, df =1). 640 641
Decoding Surprise Levels in Perception from Surprise Levels in Financial Tasks 642
We then performed a classification of beta values extracted from a pre-defined set of 643 regions to support our results in the model-based univariate analysis above. Our aim 644 was to determine if surprise-related neural responses in Financial Uncertainty could 645 accurately predict those in Perceptual Uncertainty. 646
To address this question, we constructed two general linear models, one for the Card 647
Game and one for the Necker Cube Continuous Task where Card 2 onsets, 648 respectively perceptual switches, were separated into low, medium and high levels of 649 surprise. For the Card Game, low surprise included the lowest 3 values; mid surprise, 650 the following 3 surprise values in the ordinal scale; and for high surprise, the highest 651 3 values of surprise. For the perceptual task, low surprise included switches for the 652 fully ambiguous Necker Cube; mid surprise, the 35%/65% Necker cubes; and high 653 surprise, the 20%/80% Necker cubes. 654
Our study was based on previous work identifying the striatum and the anterior insula 655 as neural correlates to uncertainty. Our a priori list of candidate regions for surprise 656 therefore included bilateral anterior insulae; caudate; putamen; and ventral striatum, 657 totaling 8 features for our classification in all. 658
Our training set was composed of beta values for the above regions corresponding to 659 low, medium and high surprise in the Card Game for all participants included in the 660
Financial Uncertainty experiment and our test set, regional beta values for all 661 participants included in the Necker Cube continuous task. Beta values represented 662 predictors, while surprise labels comprised outcome variables. We performed an 663 initial feature selection on the regions as a means of dimension reduction using an 664 ANOVA, and retaining only those regions whose classification score was significant 665 at the p =0.05 threshold. The following regions were retained: left anterior insula (F = 666 6.18; p =0.003); right anterior insula (F = 4.78; p = 0.011; left caudate (F = 3.24, p = 667 0.045); and left putamen (F = 3.20, p = 0.047). 668
We employed a random forest classifier to predict perceptual surprise from financial 669 Surprise and found a classification accuracy of 38%. Of the four features retained to 670 perform this classification, the right anterior insula, followed by the left anterior 671 insula, were the regions that best contributed to accurate predictions. Above-chance 672 accuracy is often taken as a measure of predictive power in machine learning 673 paradigms, but caution must be taken in the case of our results, as an accuracy of 38% 674 presents low predictive power (Combrisson & Jerbi, 2015) . We performed a 675 permutation test to examine the significance of the accuracy score above (1000 676 permutations) and obtained a classification score of 0.45, p = 0.004. It must be noted 677 that accuracy for low and mid surprise classification exceeded that of high surprise in 678 particular (F1 scores of 0.45, 0.48 and 0.09 for low, mid and high surprise, 679 respectively). To probe the presence of a generalized neural correlate of the inferential process in 688 both value-based decision-making and perception, we applied formal accounts of risk 689 and surprise (Preuschoff et al., 2008b) to BOLD signals arising from uncertainty in 690 financial and perceptual domains. Using the Necker Cube to elicit perceptual 691 uncertainty, behavioral results show that experimental manipulation of the stimulus 692 succeeded in expanding the range of probabilities associated with two percepts, 693
allowing for a derivation of perceptual uncertainty. To capture the endogenous 694 inferential process related to perception, we model fMRI BOLD responses to viewing 695 ambiguous stimuli with a formal account of predicted uncertainty (risk), finding a 696 significant response in the anterior insula. We then modeled perceptual switches with 697 a formal account of predicted uncertainty error (surprise), and found a response in that 698 same region. We further administered a well-established gambling task in the same 699 individuals, replicating results in the anterior insula for surprise. Insular responses to 700 surprise across tasks were found only when applying a false discovery rate,(Benjamin 701 & Hochberg, ) and did not survive the more conservative FWE correction (Han and 702 Glenn, 2018). A whole-brain conjunction analysis of the two tasks nonetheless finds a 703 significant cluster exclusively in the left anterior insula. A decoding analysis further 704 finds anterior insula response to financial surprise predicts regional responses to 705 perceptual surprise. Our results suggest a common neural system dedicated to 706 processing uncertainty in the anterior insula and more generally, support the 707 theoretical framework of the brain as an inference machine (Friston, 2010) , 708 irrespective of stimulus or goal features. 709
710
Our tasks differed in several dimensions, retaining a commonality in uncertainty and 711 hence, an unavoidable inferential process. We lift an objective, explicit model of 712 uncertainty from economics, and apply it to a perceptual paradigm, with all that the 713 latter implies: spontaneity, subjectivity and absence of conscious deliberation. In the 714 Card Game, surprise arises in response to a changing external stimulus (card value), 715 while in the Necker Cube surprise emerges from an internal change to a constant 716 external stimulus. The distinction between internal and external attribution of 717 uncertainty (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982) is by-passed with the use of both a 718 computational framework and neuroimaging. Cross-domain studies of decision-719 24 making are rare (Basten et al., 2010) but we ventured across the sub-disciplines of 720 neuroeconomics and psychophysics, motivated by two assumptions: first, the 721 historical Helmholtzian view of inferential processes in relation to brain function, and 722 second, the notion that computational accounts of decision-making, if true, should 723 hold for any decision type (O'Connell et al., 2018) . 724 725
Perceptual Switches as Involuntary Decisions 726
Several fMRI studies have probed perceptual switches (Frässle et al., 2014; Sterzer et 727 al., 2009 ), but we examine their underlying, latent decision variables with a 728 computational framework applied to fMRI signals, which allows us to empirically 729 capture the hidden process of perceptual uncertainty. The Necker Cube provokes 730 sharp transitions between perceptual states, providing an ideal stimulus to capture 731 perceptual error, unlike binocular rivalry for instance, where more gradual transitions 732 exist, introducing a temporal ambiguity in relation to the emergence of the error (e.g., 733
Leopold et al., 1998; Naber et al., 2011) . Perceptual switches are thought to be 734 spontaneous and involuntary (Sterzer & Kleinschmidt, 2007) , but there are questions 735 on whether they are subject to volitional control (Hugrass & Cuther, 2012; van Ee et 736 al., 2005) . In the study above, participants were encouraged to view stimuli passively, 737
to control for willful perceptual switches. Further, dominance times recorded follow a 738 stochastic time-course, suggesting spontaneous switches in perception. 739 740
Perceptual Switches as Prediction Errors 741
By casting perceptual switches as prediction errors, we allay controversies regarding 742 top-down (Wang et al., 2013; Long & Toppino, 2004; Sterzer et al., 2009 ) versus 743 bottom-up (Polonsky et al., 2000 Parkonen et al., 2008; Pearson et al., 2007) 744 processing in ambiguous stimuli, as the iterative process of prediction and error 745 exchanges information between low-and high-level areas (Rao & Ballard, 1998; 746 Summerfield & de Lange, 2014) . Nonetheless, few studies have explicitly modeled 747 switches as prediction errors. Sundareswara and Schrater (2008) characterize switches 748 as inferential processes by applying a Markov Renewal Process to Necker Cube 749 dominance times. In an fMRI study, a Bayesian account modeled switches in 750
Lissajous figures as prediction errors (Weilnhammer et al., 2017) . While both 751 stimulus and formal account differed from ours, Weilnhammer and colleagues 752 nonetheless find a response in the anterior insula to perceptual switches, in line with 753 our results. 754 755
Parsimony in Model Choice 756
The brain's frugality (Bullmore & Sporns, 2012) suggests it deploys parsimonious 757 computational models in resolving uncertainty (Schwartenbeck et al., 2015; Friston et 758 al., 2012; Clark, 2017) . Various models have been used to quantify uncertainty (Rao, 759 2010; Kepecs & Mainen, 2012; Vilares et al., 2012) but we opted to couch the mean-760 variance theorem (accounting for risk), within a predictive coding framework (to 761 measure surprise), first to build on our previous work (Preuschoff et al., 2006; 762 Preuschoff et al., 2008a; Preuschoff et al., 2011) but also due to its simplicity. In 763 economics, the mean-variance framework encapsulates uncertainty by integrating 764 both the mean and variance (risk) of a utility distribution (Kroll et al., 1984; 765 Markowitz, 1952) . From a homeostatic perspective, this framework presents an ideal 766 model of uncertainty because decision-making with only two values leaves an agent 767 neurally unencumbered, and accounting for risk facilitates learning, as estimating an 768 option's range shortens the trial-and-error process (D'Acremont & Bossaerts, 2008) . 769
It is worthwhile to note that several models can capture uncertainty (Friston, 2010) 770 and some may be better suited to alternative paradigms, such as ones with an explicit 771 learning component. 772 773
Neural Specificity of First Order Prediction Errors 774
We replicate previous neuroimaging results for reward prediction error, notably its 775 striatal correlate. Perceptual errors however correlate with a distinct response pattern 776 in visual areas, suggesting these first-order errors elicit feature-specific neural 777 responses; these errors nonetheless also implicate the hippocampus and temporal lobe, 778 suggesting they recruit activity at the cognitive level, as would be expected in 779 predictive coding (Clark, 2013) . In contrast to reinforcement learning studies (Schultz 780 et al., 2010; Kuhnen & Knutson, 2005; Carlson et al., 2011) , we do not find a striatal 781 involvement for perceptual error. This absence of striatal response in the perceptual 782 domain supports a neural specificity to first-order prediction errors (Clark, 2013) . The 783 striatum has been hypothesized to act as a learning center and not just a reward hub 784 (Balleine et al., 2007; Hare et al., 2008; Tricomi et al., 2009; Daniel & Pollman, 785 2014) , an assumption that would see striatal responses to any prediction errors, 786 26 including perceptual ones. Our results may challenge this postulated role for the 787 region but could also indicate the absence of overt learning in our task. First-order 788 prediction errors may account for case-specific decision features: BOLD responses in 789 visual areas to perceptual prediction errors may reflect upstream, domain-specific, 790 low-level errors (Parkkonen et al., 2008) , while the insula may act as a common, 791 downstream hub in the inference process. 792
793
The insula in perceptual errors 794
Our model-based analyses on perceptual uncertainty and surprise implicate the 795 anterior insula, in line with previous studies on value-based decision-making 796 (Preuschoff et al., 2006; Payzan-Le Nestour et al., 2013; Platt & Huettel, 2008) and 797 perception (Sterzer & Kleinschmidt, 2010) . Several studies investigating perceptual 798 decision-making find increased reaction time correlated with the anterior insula, 799
which corroborates the hypothesis that decision uncertainty relates to the region 800 specifically (Ho et al., 2009; Binder et al., 2004; Thielscher & Pessoa, 2010) . Sterzer 801 & Kleinschmidt's review on insular involvement in perceptual switches, titled "often 802 observed but barely understood", suggests salience elicits a consistent response in the 803 region but bypasses its plausible role in inferential processes (Singer et al., 2009) . We 804
propose that the insula responds to ambiguous perception because it is tuned to a 805 conscious uncertainty. This insight is important because a formal framework can 806 allow us to test populations that are less susceptible to illusions, as in autism 807 (Pellicano & Burr, 2012) and schizophrenia (Schmack et al., 2015) . Dampened insular 808 responses to uncertainty and surprise in such patient populations may underlie 809 observed deficits in decision-making. 810 811
The insula in inference 812
A considerable body of evidence implicates insular BOLD responses in a wide range 813 of functions including language (Ackermann & Riecker, 2010; Ardila et al., 2014) ; 814 auditory processing (Bamiou et al., 2003); pain (Peyron et al., 2000; Corradi-815 Dell'Acqua et al., 2011); disgust (Wicker et al., 2003) ; gustatory function (Small, 816 2010); perception (Sterzer & Kleinschmidt, 2010); decision-making (Weller et al., 817 2009; Preuschoff et al., 2008; Singer et al, 2009; Volz et al., 2005) ; uncertainty 818 (Critchley et al., 2004; Xue et al., 2010; Jones et al., 2011; Weller et al., 2009) ; and 819 emotion in general (Gasquoine, 2014) . To account for all these functions, the insula 820 has been cast as an interoceptive center, integrating bodily states into awareness 821 (Craig & Craig, 2009 ). Interoception presents a specific, if broad, category that 822 readily explains salient emotions (love, fear) as well as sensory states (gustation, 823 pain). Awareness of said states, which generally includes a declarative component, 824 may explain the insula's function in language processing. But then what of the 825 insula's contribution to uncertainty, prediction errors and perception (Klein et al., 826 2013) ? While error is generically viewed as a conflict or mistake, from a 827 computational perspective it is simply a difference between two states. In a related 828 manner, the insula constitutes a main component of the salience network in resting 829 state fMRI (Menon & Uddin, 2010) . Salience implies, at minimum, a deviation from a 830 neutral state. We hypothesize that the insula's involvement in uncertainty reflects its 831 role in mediating between upstream prediction errors (irrespective of origin) and 832 declarative states. Thus, if an agent can label a state and the latter arises from a 833 prediction error, we would expect insular involvement. 834
835
Limitations 836
In this study we provide evidence for a functional role of the anterior insula with 837 respect to uncertainty and surprise. We must note on some limitations the study 838 presented however. First, anterior insula activation did not survive whole-brain 839 family-wise error correction, only FDR, which presents a less stringent means to 840 correct for multiple comparisons. Second, while efforts were made to create a novel 841 perceptual task that matched a well-established financial task in its elicitation of 842 uncertainty, several important differences remained. The financial uncertainty task 843 presented a wider range of surprise values than the perceptual uncertainty task. Then, 844 the perceptual uncertainty task included a potential surprise component unrelated to 845 the stimulus value, in perceptual dominance times. A time-related surprise could be 846 introduced in future studies by including a stimulus onset asynchrony between onsets 847 of Card 1 and Card 2, to better approximate variability between surprising events. 848
Finally, the perceptual uncertainty task demanded a motor response to a surprising 849 event while the financial task did not. The motor response elicited anterior insular 850 responses and may have compromised surprise-related insular activity. 851 852
Inference and consciousness 853
Helmholtzian insights on inference hover over our principal question: does the brain 854 infer reality in a general manner irrespective of stimulus type (visual, monetary) or 855 end goal (adequate perception, or monetary gain)? The inferential process should be 856 the cornerstone of our interaction with an uncertain environment, regardless of 857 domain. Our aim was to exploit a parsimonious economic model of uncertainty in 858 perceptual and financial decision-making to probe the inferential process assumed in 859 both. Our perceptual task eschews key aspects of economic decisions: it is 860 unconscious, involuntary and quasi-immediate. Nonetheless, the key element of 861 uncertainty allows us to quantify the inferential process and extract measures of risk, 862
as is commonly done in economic contexts. Crucially, perceptual uncertainty does not 863 remain a mere theoretical quantity: we edify our hypothesis with an insular BOLD 864 response, mimicking the neural correlates of (economic) uncertainty processing in 865 previous studies. In examining the insula's functional role, we hypothesize that it is 866 uniquely responsible for conscious inference, the result of an inference that can be 867 recognized, as with a perceptual switch or the outcome of a gamble. Our results 868 overall suggest that uncertainty can be quantified with a common framework across 869 functional domains and further implicates a shared neural system. 870
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... Figure 1 . Stimuli and tasks. A) Procedure of the financial uncertainty task (the card game). Participants place their bet (whether the first or the second card will be higher) before the first card is revealed. Decision variables change when cards are drawn, although the decision process is already completed. Participants respond regarding their outcome to ensure they remain vigilant to the task. One trial lasts about 25 s. B) The 21 different versions of the Necker cube used in the onset task, neutral cube in the middle ("0"). C) Procedure of the "onset" Necker cube task. A version of the Necker cube is presented for 3s and participants respond whether they have seen it from above or below in a subsequent 2s interval. D) Procedure of the "continuous" Necker cube task. In "rivalry" phases, participants respond to endogenous changes in the perceptual interpretation of the presented constant Necker cube (adjusted per individual to yield five defined levels of bias in the onset task); in "replay" phases, strongly disambiguated versions mimic the preceding sequence of perceptual switches by exogenous changes. E) Mathematical models of decision variables in the Card Game (left) and Necker Cube (right) Tasks. Both tasks were subject to the same mathematical models of risk and surprise. In the Card Game, risk was computed based on the probability of winning a gamble, given the value of Card 1 (x-axis) and the bet placed, while risk prediction error (surprise) is derived from the difference between the expected risk and actual risk at the outcome of Card 2. The monetary unit on the y-axis is 1 CHF. In the Necker Cube task, risk corresponds to the variance of the probability of viewing a given stimulus from above (x-axis), and surprise computed based on the resulting percept at switch. The two diagrams above show that uncertainty related-variables (risk, surprise) are unsigned and quadratic, whereas first order errors (RPE and perceptual prediction errors) are linear. Most notable is the correspondence of the model across the two tasks to the different paradigms, stimuli and outcomes. (RPE -reward prediction error; Risk PE -risk prediction error; PE perceptual error). A) The Necker Cube Onset task GLM was comprised of a regressor for the viewing period of the cube (3s) parametrically modulated by stimulus risk, as well as a regressor including button responses. B) The Necker Cube Continuous Task included regressors for first response onsets, and a regressor for switch responses, parametrically modulated by first order perceptual prediction error; perceptual risk prediction error; and previous dominance time. C) The Card Game GLM included two regressors of no interest comprised of button presses (for bet and trial outcome), modeled as stick functions; and of sound (for request to bet and to report trial outcome), also modeled as stick functions. The sounding of cards 1 and 2 were modeled with boxcar functions (5.5s durations), parametrically modulated by expected reward and risk; and Reward Prediction and Risk Prediction Error, respectively. (PPE: perceptual prediction error: PRiPE: perceptual risk prediction error; RPE: reward prediction error; RiPE: risk prediction error) physical bias % report "view from above" Figure 2 . Behavioral data of the Necker cube tasks. A) Onset task: Fraction of "from above" reports for each of the 21 cubes (figure 1c) were fitted by a cumulative Gaussian per individual (gray lines), and to the average (black symbols, mean +/standard error of mean (sem) across subjects; black line: fit to aggregated data. B) Continuous task: predominance of the 'from above' percept (i.e., time the 'from above' precept was reported divided by the sum of times either 'from above' or 'from below' was reported). x-axis denotes individual adjusted 'from above' level according to onset task. Mean and sem across participants. C) Median duration of a dominance phase, mean and sem across observers, x-axis as in panel B. Figure 4 .A) Contrast for reward prediction error in the Card Game at the gamble's outcome shows an expected pattern of BOLD responses in the dorsal striatum (bilateral caudate) and cingulate. B) Surprise contrasts in the financial uncertainty paradigm find significant BOLD responses in the bilateral anterior insula, and middle temporal gyri and right caudate, replicating previous findings. Shown are non-parametric statistical maps thresholded at p =0.05, FDR corrected. C) fMRI results for Perceptual Risk in Necker Cube Onset Task. Risk modulation in perceptual uncertainty yields significant clusters in the bilateral insula. The viewing period of the Necker Cube (3 s) was modulated by a measure of subjective risk, based on the probability of a participant viewing a particular Necker Cube stimulus from above or from below. Images show non-parametric statistical maps thresholded at p =0.05, FDR corrected. D) Perceptual prediction errors in the Necker Cube Continuous task show significant clusters in bilateral. hippocampus, and the cuneus and also yielded several significant clusters in visual areas. E) The contrast for surprise modeled at the perceptual switch response in the Necker Cube Continuous task yields significant BOLD responses in the anterior insula as well as in occipital regions. Shown are non-parametric statistical maps thresholded at p =0.05, FDR corrected. F) Thresholded maps are shown for the conjunction analyses of surprise contrasts in the financial and perceptual tasks, masked for the left anterior insula only. These contrasts were tested against the conjunction null and the analysis constrained to one anatomical map of both left and right anterior insulae. Only the left anterior insula cluster survived FWE correction for multiple comparisons. All colorbars above represent t-values. Figure 5 . Tracking surprise as a prediction error in the Card Game and Necker Cube Continuous Tasks. Onsets of Card 2's sounding and perceptual switches, respectively, were separated according to first order prediction level (low, medium and high). A first level analysis was then performed on each surprise level for each subject. Coefficient estimates for each contrast in the anterior insula (left and right summed masks) were extracted, averaged, and plotted according to surprise level. Both low and high first order prediction errors should incur high surprise in the anterior insula. First order prediction errors incur just such a pattern, as shown in the graph above.
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